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Statement of the Case 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises from a legal malpractice/breach of fiduciary duties case between Mr. 
Martin Frantz and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley Troxell"). In roughly 2009, 
a partner at Hawley Troxell, Mr. Merlyn Clark, agreed to act as an expert witness on Mr. 
Frantz's behalf. However, during the course of that relationship, Mr. Clark blurred his expert 
witness role with that of expert consultant and counseled with Mr. Frantz's attorneys on matters 
outside the scope of his expert testimony. Resultantly, Mr. Clark and Mr. Frantz fell into an 
attorney-client relationship. 
However, late in the summer of 2010, Mr. Frantz got into a dispute with his bank, Idaho 
Independent Bank (the '·Bank"). Subsequently, the Bank hired Hawley Troxell to represent it in 
a contract action against Mr. Frantz. Before that matter was resolved in court, Mr. Frantz filed 
for bankruptcy protection in 2011. Hawley Troxell then represented the Bank in the bankruptcy 
case, and then again in 2013 in an adversary proceeding against Mr. Frantz. Prior to trial in the 
adversary proceeding, Mr. Frantz opposed Hawley Troxell's representation, but the bankruptcy 
court denied any relief finding that there was no attorney-client relationship. However, before 
the adversary proceeding reached a resolution on the merits, the case was dismissed as moot. 
Without a final resolution on the matter, Mr. Frantz filed an action against Hawley 
Troxell for malpractice and breach of fiduciary obligations in Idaho district court. At the heart of 
the issue at hand, is whether or not the mooted bankruptcy court's decision affects the state court 
litigation. 
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COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On February 20, 2015, Mr. Frantz filed his action against Hawley Troxell. On April 7, 
2015, Mr. Jefferey Katz moved for pro hac vice admission to represent Mr. Frantz. Hawley 
Troxell then, through its attorney, who had not yet appeared in the matter, filed an objection to 
Mr. Katz pro hac vice admission on April 22, 2015. About two weeks later, Hawley Troxell's 
attorney filed his notice of appearance. Then, a couple days later, on May 7, 2015, Hawley 
Troxell filed its Motion to Dismiss or Abate ("Motion to Dismiss"). The two motions were to 
have separate hearings so that Mr. Katz, once admitted, would be able to argue the Motion to 
Dismiss. 
On June 1, 2015, Mr. Frantz filed a reply to Hawley Troxell's objection. A mere two 
business days before the hearing thereon, Hawley Troxell, without court approval, submitted a 
sur-reply with additional supporting affidavits. As a result, on June 29, 2015, Mr. Frantz filed an 
objection to Hawley Troxell's sur-reply and its additional supporting affidavits. At the hearing 
on the motion for pro hac vice admission, the district court accepted Hawley Troxell's sur-reply 
and supporting documents, but continued the hearing and granted Mr. Frantz time to respond to 
Hawley Troxell's sur-reply. Mr. Frantz subsequently filed the court ordered supplemental 
briefing supporting Mr. Katz's motion for admission. 
Mr. Frantz further filed an objection to the Motion to Dismiss on July 14, 2015, to which 
Hawley Troxell filed a reply. Finally, on July 28, 2015 the court heard oral argument on both 
matters. On July 29, 2015, in a written memorandum, the district court denied Mr. Katz's 
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pro hac 
Hawley Troxell and partly for reasons the district court raised sua sponte. 
Then, on August 7, 2015, Hawley Troxell moved for costs and attorney fees. The 
Frantzes objected, but at a hearing on the matter, the district court granted Hawley Troxeii costs 
and attorney fees anyway. On August 21, 2015, Mr. Frantz filed his appeal of the district court's 
decisions to deny Mr. Katz's motion for admission, grant the Motion to Dismiss, and grant 
Hawley Troxell's request for attorney fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pre-Litigation 
Mr. Frantz, throughout his career has hired scores of attorneys throughout the western 
U.S. and Alaska for transactional work. (R. 204). Nearly all of those attorneys are known to Mr. 
Frantz by their name, not by their firm's name. Id. 
In or around 2000, Mr. Frantz, or an entity that he controlled, purchased property in 
Lewiston, Idaho for the purpose of developing a Guardian Angel Homes assisted living facility. 
(R. 194-96)1. Unbeknownst to Mr. Frantz, Mr. Frantz's real estate agent and the land seller 
colluded to inflate the price of the land so that the seller would receive more for the property and 
the agent would receive a larger commission. Id. Several years later, when the fraud was 
discovered, Mr. Frantz hired a Coeur d'Alene attorney to represent him against the seller and the 
real estate agent. Id. However, that attorney failed to file against the real estate agent within the 
1 The facts regarding Hawley Troxell' s prior representation were previously set forth in the 
Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, which comprises pages 194-96 of 
the record herein. 
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statute limitations. was dismissed summarily on 
the statute. Id. 
Resultantly, Mr. Frantz filed a malpractice case against his Coeur d'Alene attorney. Id. 
In that iitigation, in 2009, Mr. Frantz hired Meriyn Ciark, a partner at Hawley Troxell, to act as 
an expert witness on the matter of malpractice liability against Mr. Frantz's former attorney. (R. 
15). While Mr. Clark was initially retained as an expert witness, Mr. Clark ended up reviewing 
and/or discussing confidential information relating to the value of the Guardian Angel Homes 
facility. (R. 15). Further, Mr. Clark consulted on areas of the case outside of Mr. Clark's expert 
testimony. (R. 198-99). As a result, Mr. Clark's role morphed from that of a testifying expert to 
that of consulting expert thereby forming an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Frantz. Id., see 
also R. 197-200. Mr. Frantz personally paid Hawley Troxell more than $10,000 for Mr. Clark's 
services. (R. 196). 
In 2010, Mr. Frantz got into a dispute with his Bank over a real estate loan. (R. 16). The 
Bank hired Hawley Troxell to represent them in that dispute; Mr. Clark did not participate in that 
case. Id. As such, Mr. Frantz did not at that time realize he had hired Hawley Troxell before. 
(R. 204). Shortly thereafter, Mr. Frantz filed for bankruptcy. (R. 16). Early on in the 
bankruptcy case, Mr. Frantz disputed Hawley Troxell's representation based on a potential 
conflict of interest relating to a different matter. Id. However, after reviewing that matter, Mr. 
Frantz stipulated that under those circumstances there was no conflict. Id. Yet, despite Mr. 
Frantz raising the conflict issue, Hawley Troxell ignored Mr. Clark and Mr. Frantz's affiliation 
and never once mentioned Mr. Clark's connection to Mr. Frantz. (R. 205-06). Notwithstanding 
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that not 
Hawley Troxell has repeatedly proclaimed the stipulation as a waiver of any conflict of interest. 
Id. 
Roughly two years later, the Bank filed an adversary proceeding against Mr. Frantz 
alleging that Mr. Frantz had fraudulently represented the value of his assets, including his 
Guardian Angel Homes assets (which lawsuit will be referred to as the "Adversary 
Proceeding"). (R. 201). In that litigation, the Bank once again hired Hawley Troxell for 
representation. (R. 16). Until that time there was no nexus between the confidential information 
regarding the valuation of the Guardian Angel Homes assets, which Hawley Troxell possessed, 
and the lawsuits to which Mr. Frantz and the Bank were embroiled. (R. 201-03). As a result, 
Mr. Frantz did not sustain damages until Hawley Troxell represented the Bank in the Adversary 
Proceeding, well after the chapter 7 bankruptcy case was underway. Id. 
It was near the end of the Adversary Proceeding when Mr. Frantz discovered that Hawley 
Troxell was in possession of confidential information. (R 203-04). Upon discovering such, Mr. 
Frantz 1) hired a malpractice attorney, Mr. Jefferey Katz, to represent him in any future litigation 
thereon, and 2) moved to disqualify Hawley Troxell in the Adversary Proceeding. (R. 193-212)2. 
Pursuant to that representation, Mr. Katz sent a demand letter to Hawley Troxell. Roughly a 
month later, the motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell was heard in the Adversary Proceeding. 
(R. 72). While the judge there denied the motion, the entire Adversary Proceeding was later 
dismissed as moot; it never went to trial and there was no final judgment on the merits. (R. 352, 
2The Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell filed in the Adversary Proceeding. 
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41 was deprived of to seek an ofthe 
order denying Mr. Frantz's motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell. See Tr, p. 15, In. 21-23. 
In the hearing to disqualify Hawley Troxell in the Adversary Proceeding, Mr. Frantz 
sought to introduce the expert opinion of Mr. Jeffrey Katz. (R. 3 i 7-24, the expert disciosure for 
Mr. Katz). While Mr. Katz, had already agreed to represent Mr. Frantz in litigation against 
Hawley Troxell "Mr. Frantz only had a couple of weeks in which to prepare for the evidentiary 
hearing" on disqualification, no other expert was available on such short notice. (R. 341). 
Regardless, the bankruptcy court did not allow the parties to present any expert testimony. (R. 
350, iJl I). As such, Mr. Katz never acted as an expert witness in the case. Id at i!12. 
Mr. Katz's Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission 
Several months later, Mr. Frantz filed this suit against Hawley Troxell in state court. (R. 
8). In the meantime, on March 9, 2015, Mr. Katz contacted the Bank about this malpractice 
litigation. (R. 332). After receiving no response, this litigation proceeded when Mr. Katz 
applied for pro hac vice admission. (R. 22-23). Mr. Frantz served the motion on Hawley Troxell 
directly as no attorney had yet appeared on Hawley Troxell' s behalf. Id. 
Then, in June 2015, Mr. Frantz contacted the Bank directly with a proposal to end the 
litigation between the parties. (R. 333-335). Mr. Frantz's proposal was based on his belief that 
the Bank could be a co-plaintiff in this very same litigation against Hawley Troxell. (R. 334) 
(" ... it would be an advantage to Hawley-Troxell if [the Bank} were to join in the case . .. ") 
3 The entire docket for the Adversary Proceeding was filed. R. 418, docket entry 116 states, 
"Hearing Held ... Report of Proceedings ... this Adversary Proceeding is rendered MOOT. 
The trial ... is hereby VACATED." 
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essence, the as a plaintiff, 
allow the Bank sole discretion to accept or reject settlement proposals, if any, to itself and Mr. 
Frantz, and 3) pay the Bank the first $4,000,000 of settlement proceeds, if any. (R. 333-335). 
This wouid ail be in exchange for extinguishing any aiieged indebtedness between Mr. Frantz 
and the Bank. Id. 
It's true, in the emailed offer Mr. Frantz engaged in puffery and exaggerations, but such 
statements are typical of settlement offers. Id. For example, Mr. Frantz made the claim that the 
disqualification motion was a "probe" to evaluate this malpractice litigation. (R. 334). 
However, that statement is nothing more than posturing as I) Mr. Katz had already agreed to 
represent Mr. Frantz in this litigation, and 2) the motion was lost. (R. 346, im. Further, the 
disqualification hearing was not a sham but an attempt to prevent Hawley Troxell from claiming 
that Mr. Frantz failed to mitigate his damages. (R. 347, ,i 14, R. 350, ,i 9). Regardless, the Bank 
never accepted the offer to join this litigation as a co-plaintiff 
With this lawsuit underway, Hawley Troxell objected to Mr. Katz's pro hac vice 
admission. (R. 24). In its objection Hawley Troxell cited two reasons for preventing Mr. Katz's 
admission: 1) Hawley Troxell claimed that the motion was not served on its counsel- despite no 
counsel having yet appeared at that time4- and 2) it questioned whether Mr. Katz was aware of 
Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct and whether or not he would comply with them. (R. 24-
4 Hawley Troxell submitted false, inadmissible hearsay evidence indicating that Hawley 
Troxell's counsel had appeared in the matter via a phone conversation with Mr. Frantz's counsel. 
See (R. 27-28) Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, (R. 313) hearsay objection to said affidavit, (R. 
309-10) Declaration of Jonathon Frantz outlining the actual contents of the phone conversation. 
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that 
Troxell fabricated ethical violations and concocted a scheme to require Mr. Katz as a witness. 
(R. 361-67). To that end, Hawley Troxell made wild claims that Mr. Katz had been 
communicating with a represented party, the Bank, even though Hawley Troxell was well aware 
that, 1) Mr. Katz had only communicated with the Bank about this lawsuit, and 2) the Bank was 
not represented in this matter. (R. 306-308). Then, when Hawley Troxell's fabricated ethical 
violation was dispelled, Hawley Troxell claimed that Mr. Katz would be a witness and therefore 
could not be act as an attorney pursuant to I.R.P.C. 3.7(a). (R. 363-65). Without consideration 
for any attorney-client privilege rules, Hawley Troxell claimed that it wanted to use Mr. Katz's 
testimony to show Mr. Frantz' s motive in filing this malpractice litigation. Id. 
Mr. Frantz responded by not only pointing out that Mr. Katz had no independent 
knowledge of the case, but also that even were he to be a witness, I.R.P.C. 3.7 only bars an 
attorney who is a witness from being the attorney during the trial. (R. 428-30). On July 28, 
2015, the district court held a hearing on the matter. (R. 439). After the hearing, the court 
entered a ruling denying Mr. Katz motion for admission because, 
The Court finds Katz will likely have to testify in this case. The Court finds none 
of the three exceptions to IRPC 3.7(a) apply to Katz as a witness. Thus, this 
Court finds that it would be improper to allow admission pro hac vice of an out of 
state attorney who would, if appointed, violate the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Responsibility ... , [by violating the] prohibition of likely being a witness in a 
matter. 
(R. 454). The court believed that Mr. Katz would be a witness because on March 9, 2015, Mr. 
Katz sent the Bank's CEO an email stating, "I represent Marty Frantz in a newly filed action 
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former attorneys at I would to matter 
you and discuss how it may be financially beneficial to you." Id. 
The Motion to Dismiss 
On May 7, 2015, Hawley Troxell also filed a Motion to Dismiss or Abate pursuant tu 
I.R.C.P. l 2(b )(8). (R. 273). The bases for its motion consisted of I) collateral estoppel and/or 
res judicata, and 2) that the parties are litigating the same issue in different lawsuits. (R. 275-
86). The facts supporting Hawley Troxell's first contention revolve entirely around the denial of 
the motion to disqualify which Mr. Frantz raised in the Adversary Proceeding. Id. The second 
contention is based on the fact that, while the Adversary Proceeding had already been deemed 
moot, there was still pending requests for fees and costs. Id. 
The Frantzes responded by showing that the Adversary Proceeding had been rendered 
moot by the judge in that case and that there would never be any judgment on the merits in the 
Adversary Proceeding, and therefore neither issue nor claim preclusion would ever apply. (R. 
352-56). Further, with the Adversary Proceeding rendered moot, there was no longer a second 
pending action; as such, abatement was improper. 
Still, at the July 28, 2015 hearing on this matter, the district court raised sua sponte, its 
own issue regarding standing or judicial estoppel. (Tr, p. 9, ln. 17-24). While Mr. Frantz did 
address the impromptu issue at the hearing, the following day the district court entered an order 
dismissing and abating this case for the following reasons: 1) judicial estoppel (R. 441 ), and 2) 
because there is "another action pending between the same parties for the same cause." (R. 452). 
The district court, in finding judicial estoppel, relied on the premise that, 
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Judicial "when the knowledge of enough 
to know that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy, but fails to amend his schedules or disclosure statements to identify 
the cause of action as a contingent asset." 
(R. 441 )( emphasis in original). The district court went on to find that "It is clear that the cause 
of action in this present case arose during the pendency of Frantz' bankruptcy proceedings" and 
for that reason applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel and dismissed this matter. (R. 442). 
In finding that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same 
cause, the district relied on the fact that "The same parties in the present case are ( and have) 
litigating (and have litigated) the same issues in the bankruptcy case." (R. 452) ( emphasis 
added). 
The Motion for Attorney's Fees 
After the order dismissing the case was entered, on August 7, 2015, Hawley Troxell 
moved for its attorney fees citing I.C.§12-120, claiming this matter is the result of a commercial 
transaction, and LC.§ 12-121, asserting that this matter was brought frivolously. (R. 486). Mr. 
Frantz objected to the motion because the malpractice matter at issue in this case is not at its 
heart a commercial transaction nor was it brought frivolously. (R. 491-495). At oral arguments 
on the matter, the district court found that the gravamen of this suit was commercial in nature. 
(Tr, pp. 50-52). But it also found that this suit was brought frivolously: 
The misguided nature leads also to my alternate finding. . . The relief 
sought by Frantz and the legal theory underpinning that requested relief 
demonstrate the absurdity of this litigation, and I've already found it to be absurd. 
It is not at all a stretch to find it frivolous, and I agree completely with the 
defendant's argument that - the underpinning on this state lawsuit that I'm 
deciding is that Merlyn Clark was hired as Frantz's attorney, and that was 
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never the case, and it can't be the case. He was hired as an expert witness 
his attorneys on Frantz's behalf. The bankruptcy court was clear that there 
wasn't a - that what Frantz tried to do claiming a conflict wouldn't fly, and then 
this lawsuit is filed, and I think having such a clear opinion from the bankruptcy 
judge is-results in this case in the state court being frivolous, so its frivolous at 
two junctures: One to say that Merlyn Clark was Frantz's attorney and, 
second, to fiie this ciaim in state court after a bankruptcy judge had said no, 
there's no conflict because he wasn't his attorney. 
(Tr, pp. 50-52) ( emphasis added). As such, attorney fees were awarded. Id. at p. 54-55. Shortly 
thereafter, Mr. Frantz filed an appeal. (R. 501). 
Issues Presented on Appeal 
1. Did the district court err in finding that Mr. Frantz is judicially estopped/lacks standing to 
bring a suit which accrued after his chapter 7 bankruptcy commenced? 
2. Did the district court err in dismissing this action pursuant to IRCP 12(b )(8) finding that 
another action was pending between the same parties for the same cause when the other 
action had already been dismissed as moot? 
3. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Katz pro hac vice admission? 
4. Did the district court err in awarding attorney fees pursuant to 12-120(3)? 
5. Did the district court err in awarding attorney fees pursuant to 12-121? 
Argument 
MR. FRANTZ IS NOT JUDICIALLY ESTOPPED FROM BRINGING THIS LAWSUIT 
The district court misapplied the judicial estoppel/standing issues because the court 
believed the proper inquiry was whether or not Mr. Frantz became aware of this litigation during 
the pendency of his bankruptcy. However, a proper inquiry looks at when this cause of action 
accrued. Because this malpractice action did not accrue until after Mr. Frantz's chapter 7 
bankruptcy case began, judicial estoppel cannot apply. 
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that at the commencement of a bankruptcy case, an estate is 
created. Further, that bankruptcy estate is comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the 
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case .. , 11 USC §541 (a)(l) ( emphasis 
added). As a general rule, aii interest obtained after the commencement of a chapter 7 case 
remains property of the debtor. Id. 
Even causes of action can be included in the bankruptcy's expansive definition of 
property. See Schertz-Cibolo-Universal City v. Wright (In re Educators Grp. Health Tr.), 25 
F .3d 1281, 1283 ( 5th Cir. 1994 ). The determination of whether "a particular state cause of action 
belongs to the estate depends on whether under applicable state law the debtor could have 
raised the claim as of the commencement of the case." Id. (emphasis added). For example, in 
Wade v. Bailey, the parties there did not dispute "that a cause of action belonging to a debtor as 
of the [bankruptcy] petition's filing becomes property of the estate." 287 B.R. 874, 881 (S.D. 
Miss. June 26, 2001 ). Nor was there a question in Wade "that the causes of action in the instant 
case did not belong to the [debtors] until after the petition was filed." Id. Because "the 
appellee's claims [in that case] had not accrued as of the commencement of the appellee's 
bankruptcy proceeding" the court in Wade found that "the lawsuit in question belongs to the 
[debtors], and not the estate, and that the [debtors] have standing to pursue the lawsuit." Id. at 
882. 
Conversely, in In re Forbes, the court there found that a debtor's cause of action for 
wrongful discharge was appropriately property of the estate. 58 B.R. 706, 707 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1986). The court reached this conclusion by reviewing the following facts: 
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defendant believed from the moment was (two 
months before bankruptcy) that he had been illegally terminated by the city. 
The cause of action for tortuously interfering with a contract accrues when the 
damage is suffered. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citation removed). Because the cause of action accrued before the debtor 
in Forbes filed his bankruptcy petition, it was property of the estate. Id. Therefore, what the 
courts look at to determine whether or not a cause of action belongs to the debtor is whether or 
not the cause of action accrued before or after the debtor files bankruptcy. 
It is important to distinguish between when a cause of action accrued and when the action 
was filed. See Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir. Ct. App. 
2001 ). It does not matter when the cause of action was filed; it only matters when it accrued. Id. 
at 784-85. In Hamilton, a debtor had knowledge that "a cause of action against State Farm 
existed at the time he filed for bankruptcy." Id. at 785. However, he failed to disclose that claim 
in his bankruptcy and waited until one year after his bankruptcy before filing the claim. Id. at 
784. Still, it did not matter when the case was filed, only that it existed and he knew about it at 
the time he filed for bankruptcy; therefore, the claim belonged to the bankruptcy estate. Id. 
In the case at bar, Mr. Frantz was not damaged until after his chapter 7 bankruptcy case 
had cornmenced. 5 Hawley Troxell did not file the Bank's Adversary Proceeding until well after 
the chapter 7 case was underway; Hawley Troxell did not use Mr. Frantz's confidential 
information until after the chapter 7 bankruptcy had already commenced. Like Wade, neither 
Hawley Troxell nor the district court contend "that the causes of action in the instant case did not 
5 This fact is not in contention by either Hawley Troxell or the district court. 
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was court 
concludes that Mr. Frantz knew about the cause of action during the pendency of the bankruptcy. 
As a result, like in Wade, where the claim was found to belong to the debtor, this instant lawsuit 
by Mr. Frantz against Hawiey TroxeH appropriately belongs to Mr. Frantz. 
Unlike Forbes, where the cause of action accrued two months before bankruptcy, Mr. 
Frantz' s cause of action against Hawley Troxell did not arise until after the bankruptcy case was 
filed. Therefore, while the estate in Forbes owned the cause of action, here the estate does not 
own Mr. Frantz's cause of action. 
The district court's primary error comes from its uncomplete reading of McCallister v. 
Dixon. 154 Idaho 891 (2013). The district court's opinion relies heavily on McCallister. See R. 
440-444, Memorandum Decision and Order. However, the district court errantly cites 
McCallister, and the opinions on which it relies, for the proposition that, 
Judicial estoppel will be applied 'when the debtor has knowledge of enough facts 
to know that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy, but fails to amend his schedules or disclosure statements to identify 
the cause of action a as a contingent asset.' 
(R. 441) (emphasis in the Order). The district court specifically emphasized the phrase, "during 
the pendency of the bankruptcy" because it mistakenly believed that all lawsuits that arise during 
6 It should be noted that Hawley Troxell actually did not make any claims as the court raised this 
matter sua sponte. However, the court, like in Wade, admits that Mr. Frantz's claim against 
Hawley Troxell arose "during the pending bankruptcy proceeding." (R. 440). A claim that 
arises during a pending bankruptcy proceeding necessarily have arisen after the bankruptcy was 
filed. 
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estate. 
of the district court's opinion. The district court continued, 
The bankruptcy case was ongoing at the time the Complaint was filed. The focus 
of this Court's inquiry is when Frantz became aware of the potential malpractice. 
Based on the foregoing it is clear that Frantz had knowiedge of any potentiai iegai 
malpractice claims against Hawley Troxell during the bankruptcy proceeding ... 
rest 
(R. 444) (emphasis added). The foregoing ruling is demonstrative of the district court's error. 
The district court concluded that, since Mr. Frantz became aware of the case during his 
bankruptcy, pursuant to McCallister the claim against Hawley Troxell belongs to the estate, not 
Mr. Frantz. 
However, the district court should not have "focused" on when Mr. Frantz became aware 
of the potential malpractice, but on when the malpractice case accrued in relation to when the 
bankruptcy case was filed. Mr. Frantz's claim against Hawley Troxell did not accrue until after 
the bankruptcy case was well underway. As discussed above, neither the district court nor 
Hawley Troxell contend otherwise. As such, the district court plainly erred when it dismissed 
Mr. Frantz's case based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel or standing. 
THERE WAS NO OTHER ACTION PENDING BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
The district court next misapplied 12(b)(8) abatement by concluding that there was 
another action pending between the same parties over the same matter even though the elements 
for disqualification are vastly different from the elements of malpractice. In Idaho, there is little 
guidance on what is deemed to be the "same matter." However, other states offer valuable 
insight. 
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Indiana. two matters are "same depends on "the 
the subject matter, and remedies are precisely or even substantially the same in both suits." 
David v. Perron, 716 NE 2d 29, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); see also Cricket Cove Ventures, LLC v. 
Gilland, 390 S.C. 312, 323 (S.C. Ct. App. 20 i 0) ("the claim must be precisely or substantially 
the same in both proceedings in order for the drastic remedy of dismissal to be appropriate under 
Rule I2(b)(8)."). 
Moreover, Illinois has already reviewed the question of whether or not a motion to 
disqualify is the same matter as a related, subsequent malpractice case. See e.g. Eckert v. 
Freeborn & Peters LLP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23477, at 12-14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2015). In 
Eckert, the district court there reviewed whether or not a denial of a motion to disqualify could 
bar the pursuit of a legal malpractice claim after an unsuccessful motion to disqualify in a 
different proceeding. Id. 12-14. The court there determined that it could not because the 
"alleged legal malpractice is not 'identical' to the question presented by [the plaintiffs] motion 
to disqualify." Id. at 13. The court reasoned that 
in order to prevail on a claim of attorney malpractice, a plaintiff must succeed in 
proving four elements: (1) an attorney-client relationship giving rise to a duty on 
the attorney's part; (2) a negligent act or omission by the attorney amounting to a 
breach of that duty; (3) proximate cause establishing that but for the attorney's 
negligence, the plaintiff would have prevailed in the underlying action; and (4) 
actual damages. By contrast, ' [ d]isqualification motions require a two-step 
analysis. The court must consider (1) whether an ethical violation has actually 
occurred, and (2) if disqualification is the appropriate remedy.' 
Id. at 13-14 (citations removed). This same consideration applies in Idaho. See Foster v. Traul, 
145 Idaho 24, 32-33 (2007) (setting forth the elements for disqualification as: I) whether the 
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be damaged in some way if the motion is not granted, 3) whether there are any alternative 
solutions, and 4) whether the possibility of public suspicion will outweigh the benefits that might 
accrue to continued representation). The ldaho elements of legal malpractice are all but identical 
to those espoused in Eckert. See e.g. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 590 (2001 ). As such, just 
like the lack of overlapping elements between disqualification and malpractice in Eckert, Idaho's 
disqualification and malpractice elements do not overlap. Thus, a motion to disqualify should 
not bar the prosecution of a malpractice claim pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8). 
Additionally, the same result occurs if Indiana's approach is adopted. While the parties 
and subject matter in disqualification motions and malpractice suits may be substantially similar, 
the remedies sought could not be any more different. A disqualification motion is a defensive 
technique preventing harm while a malpractice suit seeks redress for harm already caused; one is 
a sword while the other is a shield. In a disqualification, at worst an attorney is prevented from 
representing a party; in a malpractice suit, at worst the breaching attorney will owe the plaintiff 
money. As such, the two different proceedings cannot be deemed as the "same" for the purposes 
of I.R.C.P. l 2(b )(8) because their remedies are drastically different. 
Furthermore, there are other policy considerations that warrant keeping motions to 
disqualify separate from malpractice claims under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8). A party to a malpractice 
claim has the right to have such a claim to be considered by a jury while a disqualification 
motion is considered solely by a judge. To intertwine the two matters would be to potentially 
rob the parties of a jury trial. 
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motion in order to foreclose the defense of failure to mitigate. After all, if Mr. Frantz had 
foregone the disqualification motion and then filed this malpractice litigation Hawley Troxell 
wouid rightfuiiy have good cause to wonder why Mr. Frantz did nothing to try and prevent the 
breach. However, because Mr. Frantz did act to try and prevent the breach (by filing a motion to 
disqualify) if that hearing bars his future litigation, Mr. Frantz will be deprived a jury 
determination of his malpractice claim because a judge alone determined the disqualification 
motion, which would then be used to bar Mr. Frantz's right to malpractice litigation. Such a 
quasi-deprivation of the right to a jury trial would also have a chilling effect on plaintiffs 
willingness to mitigate damages and potential plaintiffs would be forced to choose between a 
jury and loss mitigation. 
Additionally, the burdens of proof are different. The burden of disqualification consists 
of an intricate weighing of prejudice versus the legal system's integrity, while malpractice 
requires simply a preponderance of the evidence. As such, the fact that Mr. Frantz failed in his 
attempt to disqualify Hawley Troxell should not now bar him from bringing this litigation under 
l 2(b )(8) because the two matters are not the "same." 
Even if the two matters were the same, in this case abatement should not have been 
granted because the Adversary Proceeding was mooted denying Mr. Frantz a judgment on the 
merits. The roots of abatement come from considerations of judicial economy. Scott v. Agric. 
Prods. Corp., 102 Idaho 147, 150 (1981). Abatement is closely related to the considerations of 
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Johnson, 147 Idaho 912,917 (2009). In Idaho 
[t]wo tests govern the determination of whether a lawsuit should proceed where a 
similar lawsuit is pending in another court. First, the court should consider 
whether the other case has gone to judgment, in which event the doctrine of ciaim 
preclusion and issue preclusion may bar the litigation. The second test is ... 
whether the court in which the matter already is pending is in a position to 
determine the whole controversy and to settle all the rights ~f the parties. 
Klaue, supra. at 440. ( citations removed) ( emphasis in original). The second test, abatement, 
only comes into play when no final judgment on the merits has been entered yet. In essence, 
abatement is the ·'wait-and-see" approach; let us wait and see what happens in the other, similar 
case before we proceed with this one. 
In the case at bar, that approach does not make any sense because there will never, ever 
be a final judgment on the merits because the Adversary Proceeding was dismissed as moot. 
There can never be any appeal from the denial of the motion to disqualify because the entire 
Adversary Proceeding was mooted. It is true, there were judgments entered in the Adversary 
Proceeding (i.e. for fees and costs). But there was no judgment on the merits of the case, no 
ruling on any matter contained within the complaint. And there never will be. As such, even if 
there was a "same matter" at some point in time, there certainly was none at the time the district 
court issued its opinion. It was mooted. 
It is important to note that Hawley Troxell and the district court both got lost in the fact 
that the bankruptcy case (not the Adversary Proceeding) is still pending. However, that fact is 
nothing more than a red herring as the bankruptcy case does not and cannot operate to provide 
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with a final 
that the bankruptcy case continues will not reverse the effects of the mooting of the Adversary 
Proceeding. Mr. Frantz is not endowed with authority to appeal the denial of his motion to 
disqualify merely because the bankruptcy case marches on. Instead, when the Adversary 
Proceeding was mooted, so too were Mr. Frantz's chances for appeal; likewise, the chance for a 
final resolution on the merits were mooted. As such, it does not matter that the bankruptcy case 
ensues. 
Lastly, even if this matter is to be dismissed, it should not be dismissed with prejudice as 
was done in the instant case because then the dismissal with prejudice would affect the 
proceeding in the other case. See Scott v. Agricultural Prods. Corp., 102 Idaho 14 7, 150-51 
(1981). 
MR. KATZ SHOULD BE ADM/TED PRO HAC VICE 
Idaho has no case law interpreting when pro hac vice admission should be granted. 
However, other jurisdictions have met this question head on. The fifth and eleventh Circuits 
have held, 
The District Court may [only] refuse to admit a lawyer, otherwise qualified, on a 
showing that in any legal matter ... he has been guilty of unethical conduct of 
such a nature as to justify disbarment of a lawyer admitted generally to the bar of 
the court. 
3 F3d 1553,1561 (11th Cir. 1997) (the eleventh circuit continued to apply the same standard 
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it split from the fifth not 
conduct, let alone have cause to be disbarred, he must be granted admission. 
While the district court recklessly claims that Mr. Katz "would, if appointed, violate the 
idaho Ruies of Professionai Responsibiiity, possibly for unauthorized contact" that allegation 
was not supported by any facts or consideration and ultimately the district court did "not decide 
that issue now." (R. 454). But even had it decided that issue, there is but one possible outcome: 
that Mr. Katz abided by Idaho's ethical rules; Mr. Katz never made unauthorized conduct 
because the Bank has never been represented by an attorney in this litigation. 
Hawley Troxell has claimed that it represents the Bank. While it is true, Hawley Troxell 
represents the Bank in the bankruptcy case and in the Adversary Proceeding, it has made no 
notice of appearance, nor letter, nor email, nor phone call informing Mr. Katz, Attorney Frantz, 
or Mr. Frantz that the Bank is represented in this matter. Mr. Katz has only ever contacted the 
Bank in regards to this present litigation. (R. 347, ,J20). There is simply no evidence to the 
contrary. The record is completely bereft of any evidence, direct, causal, circumstantial, or 
otherwise that would allow even an inference the Mr. Katz contacted the Bank in regards to any 
other case. As such, it is patently impossible for a court to find that Mr. Katz made unauthorized 
contact. Furthermore, to makes such a flippant, yet serious accusation while "not decid[ing] that 
issue now" is simply "misguided." 
The district court did, however, decide that "Mr. Katz will likely have to testify." As a 
result, it barred Mr. Katz based on I.R.P.C. 3.7(a), lawyer as witness. I.R.P.C. 3.7(a) states, "A 
lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary 
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will likely take place outside of trial: for example in discovery, depositions, expert disclosures, 
pre-trial motions, etc. As such, even if Mr. Katz is a necessary witness he should still be 
admitted and ailowed to represent Mr. Frantz in this matter up until trial. Besides, this case 
never made it pass the pleadings stage (after all, this case was dismissed on a 12(b) motion). 
With zero discovery conducted it seems a little early to be deciding who is a necessary witness at 
a trial which was never even scheduled. 
Therefore, since Mr. Katz has not violated any ethical rules and because I.R.P.C. 3.7(a) 
only limits a likely witness from being an attorney at trial, Mr. Katz admission pro hac vice 
should be granted. In the event that Mr. Katz does wind up likely being a necessary witness at 
trial, he would then properly be barred from representing Mr. Frantz at that time, but not until 
then. 
ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE DENIED PURSUANT TO LC.§12-120(3) 
The next error by the district court is finding that the gravamen of this matter is a 
commercial transaction. It is true that Idaho allows attorney fees in malpractice lawsuits, 
however, it does not allow them when "[t]he gravamen of [the] case was an effort to enforce a 
statutory scheme ... " Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624,631 (1995). Instead, the 
commercial transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the 
party seeks to recover. Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763 (1995). 
In Kelly, the lawsuit sought dissolution of the partnership which was formed for 
commercial purposes (real estate development). 127 Idaho at 626. The dissolution sought, 
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was to state statute. at the 
attorney fees to the prevailing party under I.C.§ 12-120(3) because the suit was to enforce a 
statutory scheme, not a commercial transaction. Id. at 631. 
Said another way, the commercial transaction entered into in Kelly was to form a for-
profit partnership. From that commercial transaction, other duties (namely the duty to perform 
dissolution) sprang forth from the statutory scheme which was triggered when the partners 
formed their partnership. 
In the present case, the commercial transaction occurred when Mr. Clark became an 
expert consultant for Mr. Frantz (like the forming of the partnership in Kelly). Mr. Frantz hired 
Mr. Clark to provide competent testimony and advice. Mr. Clark was not hired to provide Mr. 
Frantz with loyalty; Mr. Clark was not hired to keep Mr. Frantz's confidential information 
confidential. Instead, Mr. Clark's duty of loyalty, his duty to keep Mr. Frantz's confidential 
information confidential sprang up from a statutory scheme 7, not the commercial transaction (the 
same way the duty to perform dissolution sprang up from the statutory scheme of partnership 
law, not the act of forming a partnership). 
Mr. Clark's (and Hawley Troxell's) duties are derived from the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct. As such, the only reason the commercial transaction is even mentioned is 
because it triggered the statutory framework of Hawley Troxell' s professional responsibilities. 
The duties Hawley Troxell violated spring from that statutory scheme the same way the duties to 
perform dissolution in Kelly sprang from Idaho partnership statutes. 
7 The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
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way, hiring Mr. IS 
this matter. The crux of this claim is a violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct As 
such, since the commercial transaction here in not integral to this claim, but instead it is 
anciilary. Therefore attorney fees are not appropriate under LC.§ 12-120(3). 
ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE DENIED PURSUANT TO I.C.§12-121 
The last assignment of error by the district court is in finding that this matter was 
frivolous and thereby awarding attorney fees under § 12-121. The district court found that this 
case was frivolous because, 
The underpinning of this state lawsuit that I'm deciding is that Merlyn Clark was 
hired as Frantz's attorney, and that never was the case, and it can't be the case. 
He was hired as an expert witness by his attorneys on Frantz's behalf. The 
bankruptcy court was clear that there wasn't a -- ... a bankruptcy judge had said 
no, there's no conflict because [Mr. Clark] wasn't [Mr. Frantz's] attorney. 
(Tr, p. 52, 11. 1-9, 14-16). The district court clarified that this matter was frivolous "at two 
junctures: one to say that Merlyn Clark was Frantz's attorney and, second, to file this claim in 
state court after a bankruptcy judge had said no, there's no conflict because he wasn't his 
attorney." Id. at 11. 12-16. 
In short, the district court found this matter frivolous because this matter had already 
been decided in the bankruptcy court. That is claim or issue preclusion. The district court 
concludes that Mr. Clark was never Mr. Frantz's attorney because the bankruptcy court already 
determined that he was not. But, the district court concluded in its opinion on dismissal that 
claim preclusion and issue preclusion do not apply because there was not and will not be a final 
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not to 
simply cannot operate to make it frivolous. It simply does not make sense. 
For the reasons laid out above, the bankruptcy court's opinion about whether or not an 
attorney-client relationship was formed simply is immaterial, moot. It may be indicative, but it 
certainly is not probative. Both Mr. Frantz and the district court agree that res judicata cannot 
bar this claim because there is not and will not be a final judgment on the merits. How then, can 
that be the basis for finding frivolity when it is not even a basis for dismissal? 
Because the district court impermissibly finds frivolousness in an action that the court 
itself deemed to comply with the law (by not dismissing the case for that reason) the finding of 
frivolity and the subsequent granting of attorney's fees pursuant to I.C.§121 cannot stand. 
Conclusion 
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the orders of the district 
court and deny Hawley Troxell's motion to dismiss or abate, grant Mr. Katz's motion for pro hac 
vice admission, and deny Hawley Troxell's motions for fees and costs. 
Respectfully submitted on this 19th day of January, 2016. 
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